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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the Order of Summary Judgment dated 
November 2, 1989, from the Eighth District Court of Uintah 
County, Utah. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court because it is an 
appeal from a judgment of a District Court over which the Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction, Utah 
Code Annotated, §78-2-2(3). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in determining that although 
Appellant had no knowledge of his right to a cause of action the 
period of limitations would run from the date of injury October 
11, 1984. 
2. Is §78-12-25(3), Utah Code Annotated, unconstitutional 
as applied to Appellant under Article I, Section 11, of the 
Constitution of Utah? 
3. Did the lower court err in failing to find the statute 
of limitations was tolled during Appellant's period of incapa-
city? 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-12-25 (3) 
1. ... four years... 
An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 
2* All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him or his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party, 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-12-36 
3. If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for 
the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of action 
accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent 
and without a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a 
part of the time limit for the commencement of the action. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(a) 
4. In computing any period of time proscribed or allowed 
by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by 
order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, 
event, or default from which the designated period of time begins 
to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so 
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computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of 
the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 11, 1984, Appellant was injured by a gunshot when 
the pistol he was carrying, which was manufactured by Defendant, 
dropped from its holster and discharged. Appellant was totally 
incapacitated and was hospitalized for approximately two weeks. 
Obviously, Appellant knew of his physical injury on that 
date but had no knowledge of his legal injury as a result of 
Defendant's negligent manufacture of the firearm until the spring 
of 1988 during an unrelated consultation with his attorney. The 
action was filed on October 13, 1988. The Court below granted 
Defendant's motion for a summary judgment for not having brought 
the action within four years of the date of injury. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point 1: The period of limitation of action for products 
liability must not begin to run until the Appellant has knowledge 
he has a cause of action. A crucial element of such a cause of 
action is the negligence or fault of the manufacturer. The date 
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the plaintiff learns of the negligence of Defendant is the date 
the period of limitation begins. 
Point 2: Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution 
demands that all prohibitions to bringing actions for redress in 
our courts must comply with the principle of fairness, equity and 
due process. Under the facts in the present case, a failure to 
apply the Discovery Rule to the period of limitation is violative 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Point 3; The period of incapacity of Appellant directly 
caused by the wrong doing of Defendant should not be included in 
the period of limitation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TIME PERIOD FOR THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL THE PLAIN-
TIFF HAS KNOWLEDGE OF HIS "LEGAL INJURY". 
This Court has held that a Plaintiff must have knowledge not 
only that he has suffered an injury but that the injury was due 
to the negligence of the Defendant. Foil v. Bolinger, 60 2 P2d 
144 (Utah 1979); Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P2d 435 (Utah 1968). 
The Discovery Rule makes no distinction between medical 
malpractice and other torts. Stateson v. U.S., 629 F2d 1265. The 
Discovery Rule has applications in Federal tort claims, Socialist 
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Worker Party, Jordan v. A.G., 64 2 F. Supp. 1357 and throughout 
productive liability. Fidler v. Eastman Kodak, 714 F2d 192 
(1983). Hager v. Eli Lily Co., 579 F. Supp. 2464; Hansen v. A. 
H. Robbin, 338 NW2d 578. In Hanebath v. Bell Helicopter, 694 P2d 
1403 (Alaska 1984) it was held the Discovery Rule must apply to 
toll the statute from running where the negligent act is for 
whatever circumstances unknown or unknowable. 
In Fidler a Plaintiff was well aware of the injury but had 
no knowledge the injury was caused by the negligent manufacture 
of the Defendant's x-ray machine until after the passage of the 
ordinary limitation of action. The Court there held 
[T]he cause of action does not accrue until 
the Plaintiff learns or reasonably should 
have learned that he has been injured by the 
Defendant's conduct. 
Directly on point with the case at bar is Stone v. Colt 
Industries, reported at CCH 11301 U.S. District Court D. 
Massachusetts C.V.A. No. 86-1107-MA, October 31, 1986. (Adden-
dum, page A-4.) 
In Stone, on July 1, 1973, a police officer was doing an 
investigation when a pry bar struck the hammer of a gun man-
ufactured by the Defendant Colt. The gun discharged and serious-
ly injured the Plaintiff. The Court found no evidence the 
Plaintiff knew of the negligent manufacture of Defendant's gun 
until Plaintiff read an advertisement in the fall of 1984, where 
it was stated that Colt pistols, like the one he owned, could 
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discharge if dropped or were otherwise mishandled and that Colt 
would modify the pistols for owners. The Court found Plaintiff 
had filed in a timely manner since he filed within three years 
(the statutory period for Massachusetts) of acquiring the 
knowledge of Defendant's negligent manufacture. 
In the case before this Court Appellant was injured on 
October 11, 1984, when his pistol fell from its holster and 
struck the running board of his truck and discharged. Appellant 
had assumed the discharge was the natural consequence of the gun 
falling. (Plaintiff's affidavit, paragraph 6, Addendum page 
A-2.) 
In the spring of 1988 Appellant consulted with counsel in 
another matter. His attorney, who had independent knowledge as a 
gun hobbiest, informed Appellant he may have a claimr as Ruger 
pistols such as his were negligently manufactured and were the 
subject of recall by the manufacturer, Defendant Sturm Ruger. 
The Appellant acquired the knowledge of Defendant's negligent act 
in the spring of 1988. (Plaintiff's affidavit, paragraph 7, 8 
and 9.) Appellant later engaged counsel to prosecute this action 
and Appellant filed this action on October 13, 1988, well within 
the four year period. 
A critical balancing analysis is set out in Meyers v. 
McDonald, 635 P2d 84 (Utah 1981) . The Discovery Rule provides 
that the period of limitation does not begin running until the 
discovery of all facts forming the basis for the cause of action. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Meyers at 86. In the case at bar the period of limitation begins 
when Appellant knows of the negligent manufacture of the firearm. 
The negligence of Defendant is clearly an essential element of 
Appellant's cause. 
Where Defendant has denied its negligence it is incongruous 
to suggest Appellant knew or should have known of Defendant's 
negligence at the time of the injury. Under circumstances 
present in this case the failure to apply the Discovery Rule 
would be irrational and unjust. 
The hardship imposed upon Appellant by the strict 
interpretation of the limitation of action vastly outweighs any 
supposed difficulty to Defendant regarding issues of proof due to 
the passage of 48 hours. 
POINT II 
SECTION 78-12-25(3) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO PLAINTIFF AS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 11f OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The analysis of Article I, Section 11, of the Utah 
Constitution contained in Berry v. Beech, 111 P2d 670, (Utah 
1985) , at 674 is determinative of the case at bar. While Berry 
v. Beech deals with a statute of repose rather than a statute of 
limitations the analysis is equally applicable to both. 
The open Court's provision, as recognized by this Court, 
seeks to insure that every person shall have a remedy comporting 
with due process of law. An interpretation that Appellant is not 
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entitled to the benefit of the Discovery Rule as opposed to a 
victim of medical malpractice would deny Appellant fairness and 
equity. Foil v. Bolinger; Legal malpractice, Merkley v. Beaslin, 
778 P2d 16, (Utah App 1989). The court has similarly ruled 
§78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated, is unconstitutional as against 
Section 11 in Horton v. Goldminers Daughter, 118 Utah Adv. Sh. 37 
(Utah 1989), and in Klatt v. Southgate, No. 890120 filed March 2, 
1990. 
The concept of allowing a reasonable time to seek redress in 
court demands the application of the Discovery Rule and the 
balancing analysis as set out in Meyers. Failure to read a 
Discovery Rule interpretation into §78-12-25(3) renders hollow 
the right guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah to Appellant. 
By Defendant's time calculation the complaint was filed two 
days late. The Appellant was incapacitated for more than two 
weeks following the incident, and had no knowledge of the legal 
cause until years later. See affidavit of Plaintiff, page A-2 of 
Addendum. 
The redress for medical bills and other compensatory relief 
sought by Appellant must be weighed against the disadvantage 
Defendant has suffered due to stale evidence during the two day 
lapse. A failure to use the Discovery Rule analysis under these 
facts is thus prohibited by Article I, Section 11, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY INCLUDING IN THE 
PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS THE PERIOD OF DISABIL-
ITY DIRECTLY CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S NEGLI-
GENCE. 
After the discharge of the firearm on October 11, 1984, 
Appellant was hospitalized and underwent surgery for a shattered 
Humerous, chest wounds, abdominal wounds and bowel resection. 
See Complaint page 2 paragraph 8, at page A-8 of the Addendum. 
Appellant was totally incapacitated for approximately two weeks. 
See Plaintiff's affidavit, paragraph 5, at page A-3 of Addendum. 
Section 78-12-36, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
provides in part the period of a disability is not part of time 
for the commencement of the action. 
Appellant was injured on the 11th of October, 1984, and 
immediately underwent surgery with the natural attendant disabil-
ity and incompetence from surgery and anesthetic. Defendant's 
wrongful conduct caused Appellant to be under such a disability 
for approximately two weeks. 
The day the operative fact occurs is excluded from the time 
computation in computing the statute of limitation. Rule 6, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Nebola v. Minnesota Iron, 102 Minn 89. 
Under the ordinary computation of time, from the date of injury 
the time for the commencement of the action would have been 
October 12, 1984. The Complaint was mailed from Salt Lake City, 
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Utah, on October 11, 1988, and marked as received and filed by 
the Court in Vernal, Utah, on October 13, 1988. 
Equity demands that where a Defendant's negligence incapaci-
tates a Plaintiff, by causing such great injury he must undergo 
major surgery, that the period of limitation be tolled for the 
day of surgery and post operative recovery. Defendant has 
suffered no harm or disadvantage by the Clerk entering the 
Complaint on the 13th rather than the 12th. The principal of 
equitable tolling and justice demand that Appellant be allowed to 
seek redress for his injuries in our State Courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Discovery Rule dictates the time for the commencement of 
the action began when Appellant had knowledge of all the elements 
of his cause of action. Certainly that the negligent act of 
Defendant which was not known to Appellant until Spring of 1988 
is key information which must be known to Appellant before he can 
plead a cause of action. Thus, the action was timely filed. 
To comport with Article I, Section 11, of the Utah 
Constitution, §78-12-25(3) must be interpreted under these facts 
to include a Discovery Rule analysis. 
Further when Appellant is incapacitated by the negligence of 
Defendant it would be grossly inequitable to not find the statute 
tolled during his surgery and post operative recovery under these 
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facts, and especially where Defendant has shown no disadvantage. 
Respectfully Submitted this day of March 1990. 
K. C. BENNETT 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^ -^day of March, 1990, I 
cause to be mailed, postage paid, via U. S. First Class Mail, 4 
true and exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to: 
H. James Clegg 
Attorney at Law 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By: 
KIRK C. BENNETT 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRL L. ATWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STURM, RUGER & COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant• 
R U L I N G 
Civil No. 88-CV-233U 
Defendant's Motion to Strike the Memorandum and Affidavit of 
Plaintiff is denied. The court has received and considered those 
pleadings even though untimely filed. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Ruling is denied, and 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. After con-
sideration of the memoranda filed by the parties the court rules 
that the "discovery rule" upon which Plaintiff relies is in-
applicable to the instant case, that rule being limited to certain 
specified causes of action. This court agrees with the position 
taken by the Supreme Court in Myers v. McDonald, 63 5 P2d 84 
wherein it was held that "mere ignorance of the existence of a 
cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations." Accordingly, the court has herewith executed the 
Summary Judgment submitted by Defendant. 
DATED this c3*>c( day of November, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
(j^******* c^ zl 
cc: H. James Clegg, 
Kirk C. Bennett 
K. C. Bennett 
Utah State Bar No. 3700 
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRL L. ATWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STURN, RUGER & COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C^e No. 88CV233U 
Judge Dennis Draney 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
Plaintiff, Shirl L. Atwood, having been first duly sworn 
upon oath, deposes and says that: 
1. My name is Shirl L. Atwood and I am the Plaintiff in 
the above-entitled action. 
2. In the month of October of 1984 I was injured when a 
firearm manufactured by Defendant accidently discharged striking 
me in the abdomen and arm. 
3. Upon review of records it appears to me this accident 
took place on October 11, 1984. 
5. Following the accident I was totally incapacited and 
hospitalized for a period of approximately two (2) weeks. 
6. During the time period since the accident until the 
Spring of 1988 I had assumed that the discharge of the firearm 
was a natural consequence of it falling from the holster and 
striking the ground. 
7. It was not until the Spring of 1988 that while consulting 
with my attorney, K. C. Bennett, on another matter I was informed 
I might possibly have a product liability claim against Defendant. 
8. My attorney had independent knowledge that I did not 
have that the Ruger single action pistols of certain production 
series were defective and were subject to recall. 
9. This information was not known to me and I had no reason 
to suspect ray injuries were the result of uny negligence, act or 
design defect of Defendants firearm. 
10. Further Affiant sayeth naught. 
SHIRL L. ATWOOD 
Plaintiff/Affiant 
SWORN AND SUBSCRjBEDv^p b e f o r e me by S h i r l L . Atwood t h i : 
Jtl?4^ day o t J u ^ ^ i ^ S a i ' ^ v . ' ' ^ 
//?/" ~'' ' 
•s—i . ^ ' • •' — w/VT»A*>y pUBI^rC, STATE/ OF UTAH 
.ng i r A s a l t Lai&e Coun.ty 
WLss idn e x p i r e s '.^l^M^O 
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1986 WL 13073 (D.Mass.) 
Alvin E. STONE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
COLT INDUSTRIES OPERATING CORPORATION, Defendant. 
Civ. A. No. 8G-1107-MA. 
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts. 
Oct. 31, 198B. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
Mazzone, District Judge, 
The plaintiff, Alvin E. Stone, filed this diversity action for personal 
injuries against the defendant, Colt Industries Operating Corporation. Stone 
alleges in his amended complaint that Colt designed, manufactured, and sold 
defective M25 ACPM automatic pistols. Stone was injured when one of these 
pistols, which he was carrying clipped to his belt with the safety in the "on" 
position, discharged a round into his abdomen and thigh after it was "bumped." 
Stone asks for damages for Colt Industries' alleged negligence, breach of 
implied warranties, and gross, willful, and wanton negligence and breach of 
warranty. 
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This case is before me on Colt Industries motion to dismiss under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The defendant claims that Stone's action is barred by 
the applicable Massachusetts three-year statutes of limitations as the accident 
occurred on July 1, 1973, and Stone did not file his complaint until April 8, 
1986. Stone claims for the first time in his opposition to this motion that he 
did not discover that his injury was caused by a defect in the pistol until 
1984, and that he filed his complaint around eighteen months later, well within 
the three-year period. As Stone's opposition and accompanying affidavit reveal 
matters not set forth in his complaint, I treat the motion to dismiss as one 
for summary judgment pursuant to the procedure described in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). 
Stone's affidavit discloses that at the time of the accident, he was an off-
duty policeman responding to an emergency call for assistance. He was summoned 
to a serious motor vehicle accident, where he and others attempted to free a 
person trapped in a vehicle with a pry bar. The pry bar struck the pistol 
Stone had clipped to his belt, and a bullet discharged from the gun and injured 
him. He assumed at the time that the gun had discharged because the pry bar 
had struck it. In the fall of 1984, he saw an advertisement in a magazine 
which stated that Colt pistols like the one he owned could accidentally 
discharge if dropped or handled carelessly. The advertisement also stated that 
Colt would modify the firing mechanism in such pistols to substantially reduce 
the possibility of accidental discharge. Stone filed suit a year and a half 
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after reading this advertisement. 
I must decide whether Stone has filed his action in a timely manner. Since 
the federal courts apply state statutes of limitations in diversity cases, and 
since Massachusetts considers such statutes to be concerned with remedies and 
governed by the law of the forum, I apply the time periods prescribed by 
Massachusetts statutes. See Molinar v. Western Elec. Co., 525 F.2d 521, 531 
(1st Cir.1975), cert, denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976). Stone's claim for 
negligence is governed by Mass.G.L. c. 260, s 2A, which provides that "actions 
of tort ... shall be commenced only within three years ne*t after the cause of 
action accrues." The breach of warranty claim is governed by Mass.G.L. c. 
106, a 2-318, which provides that M(a)ll actions under this section shall be 
commenced within three years next after the date the injury and damage occurs." 
I must determine when these two three-year periods began to run. In 
Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Co., 714 F.2d 192, 196-197 (1st Cir.1983), the court 
decided that "the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff learns or 
reasonably should have learned that he has been injured by the defendant's 
conduct" for both negligence and breach of warranty claims in a products 
liability action. The court's approach to this unsettled area of Massachusetts 
law was confirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in a related 
case, Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 544 (1985), when that court 
stated that H(t)he court's application of the discovery rule is consistent with 
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our recognition of 'the principle that a plaintiff should be put on notice 
before his claim is barred.' " (citation omitted). Colt Industries must thus 
show that Stone learned or reasonably should have learned that he was injured 
by the defendant's conduct more than three years before he filed his action. 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the opposing party and 
indulging all inferences in that party's favor for purposes of summary 
Judgment, Voutour v. Uitale, 761 F.2d 812, 817 (1st Cir.1985), cert, denied, 
106 S.Ct. 879 (1986), I find that Colt Industries has not met this burden. The 
defendant has not contested Stone's affidavit testimony that he had no actual 
knowledge that the firing mechanism in his pistol might be defective until he 
read the magazine advertisement in the fall of 1984. Stone then filed his 
claim in April of 1986, well within the three-year limitations period. (FN1) 
Nor has the defendant shown, on the record before me, that Stone should 
reasonably have known or suspected that his injury was caused by a defect in 
the pistol. The circumstances surrounding the discharge of the gun, including 
the manner in which the pry bar struck it, might well have led Stone reasonably 
to conclude that it was the pry bar which caused the discharge. However, I do 
not foreclose the possibility that summary judgment might be appropriate for 
the defendant once discovery has been undertaken and the circumstances 
concerning the discharge of the gun are brought to light. 
I am left with one matter of procedural concern. The present amended 
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complaint on its face shows only that Stone brought his action so long after he 
received his injury that his claim would ordinarily be barred by the 
limitations period. Stone is required to plead the discovery rule exception to 
the statute of limitations defense, or face dismissal of the complaint. See 
Kmcheloe v. Farmer, 214 F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir.1954); Stewart Coach Indus, v. 
Moore, 512 F.Supp. 879, 886 (S.D.Ohio 1981), Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(f). Yet Stone 
responded to Colt Industries' motion to dismiss not by seeking leave to amend 
his complaint to plead the discovery rule exception, but instead by filing an 
affidavit which raised that issue. As Stone must affirmatively plead the 
exception, I will allow him ten days in which to file another amended 
complaint. Colt Industries may then, if appropriate, address any new matters 
raised by the amendments under either Rule 12 or Rule 56. See Hailey v. Yellow 
Freight Sys., 599 F.Supp. 1332, 1334 (W.D.Mo.1934 ). If Stone does not amend 
his complaint as set forth above, I will dismiss the action. 
SO ORDERED. 
FN1. In 1973, when Stone received his injury, the limitations periods for 
actions of tort and breach of warranty were both two years. These periods 
were increased to three years in 1974. The +hree-year periods apply to 
Stone's claims because the defendant has not shown that Stone 5 cause of 
action accrued before he discovered that his pistol might be defective in 
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1984. 
D.Mass.,1986. 
Stone v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. 
1986 WL 13073 <D.Mass. ) 
END OF OOCUMENT 
Scott R. Wangsgard 3376 
Kirk C. Bennett 3700 
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
SHIRL L. ATWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STURM, RUGER & COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
INC. ; 
I C O M P L A I N T 
> Civil No. 
) Judge: 
Plaintiff, Shirl L. Atwood, by and through his attorneys 
of record, for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Shirl L. Atwood, is a resident of Vernal, Uintah 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., is a corporation 
engaged in the manufacture and sale of firearms. 
3. Defendant, Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., manufacture, 
distribute, and sell firearms, expecting these firearms to reach 
consumers in the condition in which they are manufactured and 
sold knowing, or with reason to know, that they will be used 
without inspection for defects. 
4. On or about the 20th day of October, 1984, while 
Plaintiff was using the above-described firearm in a reasonably 
foreseeable manner, Plaintiff was injured when the firearm acci-
dently discharged striking Plaintiff in the abdomen, chest and 
upper arm. 
5. At the time of its manufacture and sale, the firearm was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous because of its propensity to 
fire when jolted. Plaintiff was unaware of any defects in the 
firearm. 
6. The condition of the firearm remained substantially 
unchanged from the time of manufacture to the time of Plaintiff's 
injury. 
7. Defendant was aware of several substantially similar 
prior accidents involving the same make and model firearm, but 
did not take adequate measures to remedy the defects. 
8. As a direct and proximate result of the defective 
condition of the firearm, Plaintiff suffered serious and severe 
personal injuries, specifically a shattered humerus at mid shaft, 
chest and abdomenal wounds requiring, among other procedures, a 
colostomy. 
9. As a direct and proximate result of the defective 
condition of the firearm, Plaintiff has sustained permanent 
disability of more than fifty percent (50%). 
10. As a direct and proximate result of the defective 
condition of the firearm, the Plaintiff has incurred expenses for 
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medical care, including the services of physicians, surgeons, 
nurses, and hospitals, and will incur further medical expenses in 
the future• 
11. As a direct and proximate result of the defective 
condition of the firearm, the Plaintiff was unable to engage in 
his regular employment for one year resulting in lost earnings 
estimated to be $10,000.00, 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, 
jointly and severally, in the following amounts: 
1. Physical injury $500,000.00; 
2. Hospital and medical expenses $7,500.00; 
3. Lost earnings $10,000.00; 
4. Punitive damages $1,500,000.00; 
5. Plaintiff's attorneys1 fees and costs incurred herein; 
and, 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just 
and proper. 
DATED this / / day of October, 1988. 
CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Plaintiff's address: 
424 East 4500 South 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
[IRK C. BENNETT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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